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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ACCIDENTS ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE
COURSE OF EMPiOYMT-Plaintiff's decedent, an expert mechanic, was
employed by defendant to make repairs and changes in the machinery used
in the various buildings of defendant's factory. His usual working hours
were from about 6:30 A. M. to 5 or 6 P. M.; he was subject to call in any
part of the plant at any time during the day but was not required to ac-
count for his time. He was authorized to get his lunch wherever and when-
ever he thought his work permitted, and it was his custom to eat lunch at
a small, independent restaurant across Twelfth Street. On the day of his
death decedent went to lunch there at about his usual time, stayed for that
purpose for his usual period, and as he was crossing Twelfth Street, on
his way toward the factory building located just across the street, he was
struck by an automobile, and died as a result of the injuries sustained.
Held, that the death of decedent was not the result of an accident, arising
out of and in the course of employment.'
Following the rule that findings of fact in a workman's compensation
case, having competent testimony to support them, are conclusive on re-
view,2 the Appellate Court affirmed the award of the Industrial Board with
one judge dissenting. This decision of the board presents the problem of
the construction of the phrases "arising out of" and "in the course of" em-
ployment, since it is now quite generally recognized that the phrases present
two entirely distinct legal problems3 although used conjunctively in the
same sentence.
An accident is said to "arise out of" the employment when there exists
a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is re-
quired to be performed and the resulting injury,4 while the phrase "in the
course of" employment is held to designate an accident occurring within the
period of employment at a place where the employee may reasonably be
while fulfilling his duties or engaged in something incidental to it.5 The
'Mitchell v. Ball Bros. (1933), 186 N. E. 900 (Ind. App.).
2Star Publishing Company v. Johnson (1925), 83 Ind. App. 309, 146 N. E. 765;
J. H. Hardin Company v. Crowe (1924), 81 Ind. App. 513, 143 N. E. 710; Steel and
Tube Company of America v. Rukovac (1923), 141 N. E. 643, 81 Ind. App. 219;
Pan Handle Coal Co. v. Decousey (1922), 78 Ind. App. 580, 136 N. B. 577; Standard
Coal Co. v. Gallagher (1921), 75 Ind. App. 1, 129 N. E. 482.
a Stacey Brothers Gas Construction Company v. Massy (1931), 92 Ind. App.
348, 175 N. B. 368; Townsend and Freeman v. Taggart (1921), 81 Ind. App. 610,
144 N. B. 556; Indiana Creek Co. v. Calvert (1918), 68 Ind. App. 474, 119 N. B.
519; Granite Sand and Gravel Company v. Willoughby et al (1919), 70 Ind. App.
112, 123 N. . 199; In re Ayers (1918), 66 Ind. App. 458, 118 N. E. 386; Holland-
St. Louis Sugar Company v. Shraluka (1917), 64 Ind. App. 545, 116 N. E. 330;
Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co. (1915), 89 Conn. 367, 94 Atl. 372; Young v.
Duncan (1914), 218 Mass. 346, 106 N. E. 1; Matter of Petrie (1915), 215 N. Y.
335, 109 N. E. 549; Donahue v. Sherman Sons Co. (1916), 65 Ind. App. 1917, 117
N. E. 276; Hopkings v. Michigan Sugar Co. v. Lewis (1916), 184 Mich. 87, 150
N. W. 324; Haskell v. Brown (1917), 67 Ind. App. 178, 117 N. E. 555; Harper,
Torts (1933), P 426.
'Holland-St. Louis Sugar Company v. Shraluka (1917), 64 Ind. App. 545, 115
N. E. 330; In re Employers Liability Assurance Company (1913), 222 Mass. 163,
109 N. E. 951; Elk Grove Union High School District v. Industrial Acc. Comm of
Cal. (1917), 34 Cal. App. 589, 168 Pac. 392.
5 Granite Land and Gravel Company v. Willoughby (1919), 70 Ind. App. 112,
123 N. E. 194; Marchratello v. Lunch Realty Co. (1920), 94 Conn. 260, 108 AtU.
799; New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell (1923), 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S. E.
786; In re Ayers (1917), 66 Ind. App. 458, 118 N. E. 386; Terlecki v. Strauss
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court in the principal case found that decedent was injured "in the course
of his lunching hour" rather than "in the course of his employment," and
that there was no causal connection between his employment and the act
resulting in his injury.
There is a long line of cases holding that the relation of master and ser-
vant may extend beyond the hours of the servant's actual labor,6 and that
acts of ministration unto himself, performance of which while at work are
reasonably necessary to his health and comfort, are acts of service within
the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act although they are in a
sense personal to himself and only remotely and indirectly conducive to the
object of the employment. 7 Thus recovery has been allowed in the follow-
ing cases: Where the employee was injured while crossing a yard to take
advantage of conveniences in the factory of another manufacturer, since
none were provided in the employer's factory;S where one was employed as
drayman continuously from eight in the morning until eight in the evening
without intervals for meals, and left'his team to get a glass of beer and was
killed by a motor car while returning; 9 where a mechanic who was subject
to call at any time, was sent out to see about a battery and while returning
stopped for lunch, started to walk back to his employer's factory to report
sales, and was injured by an auto while boarding a street car;1 where a
street car conductor having stopped his car in front of his home went in to
order his lunch sent to a place designated by his employer and was struck
by a car on another track while returning.12 The recent Indiana case of
Livers v. Graham Glass Co. permitted a recovery where a factory super-
intendent who was subject to call day and night, while on his way to check
up on the day's work, as was his custom, although he was not required to
do so, was killed in an automobile accident;13 and a Texas case permitted
recovery where a workman was killed at a railroad crossing directly on his
route to work even though the hour had not yet arrived when he was sup-
posed to report.14 In all these cases the injury occurred while the em-
ployee was not on premises owner or controlled by the employer and when
(1914), 85 N. J. Law 454, 89 Atl. 1023; Sundne's Case (1914), 218 Mass, 105
N. E. 433; Jeffries et al v. Pitman-Moore Company (1925), 83 Ind. App. 159, 147
N. E. 919.
'City of Milwaukee v. Atthoff (1914), 156 Wis. 68, 145 X. W. 238; Terlecki v.
Strauss (1914), 85 N. J. Law 454, 189 A. 1023; Jeffries v. Pitman-Moore Co.
(1925), 83 Ind. App. 159, 147 N. E. 919.
'In re Ayers (1917), 66 Ind. App. 458, 118 N. E. 386; Holland-St. Louis Sugar
Company v. Shraluka (1917), 64 Ind. App. 545, 116 N. B. 330; Archibald v. Ott
(1916), 77 W. Va. 448, 87 S. E. 791; Clem v. Chalmers Motor Co. (1914), 178
Mich. 340, 144 N. W. 848; Matter of Moore v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (1915), 154
N. Y. S. 620; Larke v. Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1916), 90 Conn. 303, 97
Ati 320, Dzlkouska v. Superior Steel Co. (1918), 259 Pa. 578, 103 Atl. 351.
8Fearnley v. Bates (1917), 117 L. T. 163; (1917-18), 27 Yale L. Rev. 424;
Zabriskie v. Erie R. Co. (1914), 85 N. J. Law 157, 92 Atl. 385.
'Martin v. Lobebard & Co. (1914), 136 L. T. 3. 402.
10 Consolidated Underwriters v. Breedlove (1924), 114 Texas 172, 265 S. W.
128.
J. E. Porter Co. v. Industrial Commission (1922), 301 Ill. 76, 133 N. E. 652.t Rainford v. Chicago Ry. Co.- (1919), 289 IlM. 427, 124 N. E. 643.
1 IAvers v. Graham Glass Co. (1931), 177 N. E. 359 (Ind. App.).1 Cundaly Packing Co. v. Pirramour (1923), 44 S. C. 153.
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he was not engaged in labor, so are somewhat difficult to distinguish from
the principal case.
The courts have had even less difficulty in finding that the accident
arose out of and in the course of the employment when the accident oc-
curred on the premises of the employer even though the employee was not
engaged in actual labor. For instance: Employee was injured while asleep
in a car provided for that purpose and was subject to call at any time;1 5
where an employee was injured after starting to lunch by the ordinary
route;lf where an employee used the customary means of ingress or egress
across the employer's premises or was injured on a way maintained by
him;17 where decedent was changing his clothing after working hours pre-
paratory to going home;18 where plaintiff, engaged in loading steel upon a
car, struck a match to light a cigarette and set fire to his oil-soaked apron
and was fatally burned;19 where an employee driver came inside after
working outside in cold weather for several hours and sat down near a
boiler fire while waiting for opportunity to use an elevator and fell asleep
and caught fire;20 where deceased died as a result of drinking from a bot-
tle which he thought contained water kept for that purpose but which in
fact contained poison; 2 ' where an employee was running from his place of
work to punch the time clock when the noon whistle blew, and was injured
by colliding with another employee; 22 where workmen were descending in
a material hoist from the top of a building where they had been working
after noon hour had begun; 23 where an employee stopped work at her
machine shortly before noon to comb her hair, as was her custom, and was
injured when her hair was caught in the machine; 24 where a park workman
who obtained shelter under a tree during a violent thunderstorm was killed
by lightning; 25 where a baker fell out of a window to which he had gone
for air during a rest period; 26 where an employee was injured in answer-
ing a private telephone call; 2 7 and in numerous similar instances.
Nor has there been any difficulty where the employee was injured on his
way to or from work on premises not owned or controlled by the em-
ployer 28 when the employee was authorized to use that way.29 In prac-
31 St. Louis A. & T. Ry. Co. v. Welch (1888), 72 Texas 298, 10 S. W. 529.
'$ Bylow v. St. Regis Paper Co. (1917), 166 N. Y. S. 874.
'
TEwald v. C. & N. W. By. Co. (1888), 70 Wis. 420, 36 N. W. 12; Jeffries v.
Pitman-Moore Co. (1925), 83 Ind. App. 159, 147 N. E. 919; Wabash Ry. Co. v.
Industrial Comm. (1920), 294 Ill. 119, 128 N. E. 290; In re Stacey (1916), 226
Mass. 174, 114 N. E. 206.
2sHenke v. Thilmarry (1900), 107 Wis. 216, 83 N. W. 360.
" Dzikowska v. Superior Steel Co. (1918), 259 Pa. 578, 103 At. 351.
0 Richards v. Indianapolis Abattoir Co. (1917), 92 Conn. 274, 102 At. 654.
=Archibald v. Ott (1916) 77 W. Va. 448, 87 S. E. 791.
=Rayner v. Sligh Furniture Co. (1914), 180 Mich. 168, 146 N. W. 664.
2" Boyle v. Columbia Fireproofing Co. (1902), 182 Mass. 93, 64 N. D. 726.
21(1913-14), 23 Yale Law Jr. 699; Terlecki v. Strauss (1914), 86 N. J. Law
708, 89 At. 1023.
0 Chulla D. Lucas v. Board of Park Comm. of Hartford (1919), 107 Atl. 611.
='National Biscuit Co. v. Roth (1925), 83 Ind. App. 21, 146 N. R. 410.
2In re Cox (1916), 225 Mass. 220, 114 N. E. 280.
2' (1916-1917), 65 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 701; City of Milwaukee v. Althoff et al
(1914), 156 Wis. 68, 145 N. W. 238; In re Sundine (1914), 218 mass, 105 N. E.
433.
2Lumberman's Reciprocal Association v. Behnkey (1922), 112 Texas 103, 246
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tically every case where recovery has been refused the employee had a defi-
nite time set aside for lunch and was not subject to the call of the em-
ployer,3 0 was using a forbidden way,31 or was not required to go into the
street and thus was not exposed to those dangers.3 2
By analogy to the cases cited in the foregoing discussion, and on the
authority of Livers v. Graham Glass Co.S3 it would seem that the Board
might fairly have reached an opposite result, particularly in view of the
repeated holding of the Indiana Court that the statute on which this action
is based should be liberally construed.34  A. A; C.
S. W. 72; (1919-20), 18 Mich. Law Rev. 439; Universal Portland Cement Company
v. Spirakes (1922), 79 Ind. App. 17, 137 N. E. 276.
30Pearce v. Industrial Comm. (1921), 299 Ill. 161, 132 N. E. 440; Moore v.
Sefton Mfg. Co. (1924), 82 Ind. App. 89, 144 N. E. 476.
"Hills v. Blair (1914), 182 Mich. 20, 148 N. W. 24; Moore v. Sefton Mfg. Co.
(1924), 82 Ind. App. 89; 144 N. E. 476; H. W. Nelson Railroad Construction Com-
pany v. Industrial Comm. of Ill. (1919), 286 I1. 632, 122 N. E. 113.
=Diebhert v. Bevens (1933), 185 N. B. 311 (Ind. App.); Clark v. Voorhees
(1921), 231 N. Y. 14, 131 N. E. 553.
33 Livers v. Graham Glass Co. (1931), 177 N. E. 359 (Ind. App.).
3H olland-St Louis Sugar Company v. Shraluka (1918), 64 Ind. App. 545, 116
N. E. 330; In re Ayers (1919), 66 Ind. App. 458, 118 N. E. 386; Nordyke & Mar-
mon Company v. Swift (1919), 71 Ind. App. 176, 123 N. E. 449; Granite Land and
Gravel Company (1919), 70 Ind. App. 112, 123 N. B. 194; In re Bollman (1920),
73 Ind. App. 46, 126 N. E. 639; United Paper Company v. Lewis (1917), 65 Ind.
App. 356, 117 N. B. 276; Haskell v. Brown (1917), 67 Ind. App. 178, 117 N. E. 555;
Indian Creek Company v. Calver (1918), 68 Ind. App. 474, 119 N. E. 519; Town-
send V. Freeman v. Taggart (1924), 81 Ind. App. 610, 144 N. E. 556; Stacey
Brothers Gas Construction Company v. Massey (1931), 92 Ind. App. 348, 175 N. B.
368.
